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RATE REGULATION AND EFFECTIVE COMPETITION
Introduction
The First Amendment prevents Congress from enacting laws that
abridge freedom of speech.1 Speech, however, can be just as effec-
tively limited by laws that constrain the returns to its purveyors as by
those that directly regulate speech itself. As Public Interest Petition-
ers comment on the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC)
cable regulatory regime, "[T]o the extent the Commission's approach
harms the launch or survival of programming services, it ... violates
the First Amendment."2 It is for this reason that the provisions of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 19921
(1992 Cable Act) that direct the FCC to regulate basic cable rates, and
the manner in which those provisions have been implemented by the
FCC, are of such great interest.
The period that followed the passage of the Cable Act of 1984,4
which effectively deregulated rates for basic cable service, was marked
by a substantial increase in the number and range of services that
cable systems offered to their subscribers. Between November 30,
1986 and December 31, 1989, the average number of channels re-
ceived by cable subscribers increased from 27.1 to 33.6 on the most
popular basic service and from 24.2 to 31.2 on the lowest price ser-
vice.5 During this same period, the number of channels offered on the
lowest price tier grew from 11.1 to 17.3, accounting for virtually the
entire increase in the number of channels offered.6 Moreover, this
growth came on top of an increase in the number of channels offered
from 7.8 to 11.1 that occurred between December 31, 1984 and No-
vember 30, 1986, so that the number of basic cable channels offered
on the lowest price service had more than doubled over the five year
period from the end of 1984 to the end of 1989.
In passing the 1992 Cable Act, Congress first acknowledged, and
then seemingly ignored, this increase in the number of cable services
available to consumers. Congress mandated the regulation of cable
rates because "[a]lthough the average number of basic services has
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Consumer Protection Act of 1992: Rate Regulation, Petition for Expedited Reconsidera-
tion of Dr. Everett C. Parker and Henry Geller (petition date May 16, 1994).
3. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter 1992 Cable Act].
4. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2806 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
5. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: FOLLOW-UP NATIONAL
SURVEY OF CABLE TELEVISION RATES AND SERVICES (1990).
6. Id. at 21.
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increased..., average monthly rates have increased by [twenty-nine]
percent during the same period. The average monthly cable rate has
increased almost [three] times as much as the Consumer Price Index
since rate deregulation in 1986."
7
Under the terms of the 1992 Cable Act, cable systems facing "ef-
fective competition," are not subject to basic service rate regulation.
Effective competition exists under the following conditions: (i) over-
built systems-a franchise area served by at least two unaffiliated mul-
tichannel video programming distributors, each of which offers service
to at least half of all households and where all but the largest of which
cumulatively serve at least fifteen percent of all households; (ii) low
penetration systems-a franchise area where fewer than thirty percent
of all households subscribe; or (iii) municipal systems-a system oper-
ated by the municipal franchising authority that offers service to at
least half of all households." For all other cable systems, the 1992
Cable Act directs the FCC to develop a method to regulate basic
cable service rates.9 From the perspective of consumers and program-
mers, there is the risk that regulation will discourage the development
of new programming by reducing the returns that cable systems and
programmers can obtain.
Although the 1992 Cable Act identifies a large number of factors
that the FCC may take into account in establishing its regulatory re-
gime for cable,' ° the approach the FCC ultimately adopted is based on
a comparison of the rates of effectively competitive and non-effec-
tively competitive systems. In particular, the FCC has conducted a
series of statistical analyses to measure the difference in rates charged
by otherwise identical competitive and noncompetitive systems.
Initially, the FCC found that the "competitive differential" was ap-
proximately ten percent.1' However, the FCC later revised its statisti-
7. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a)-(b), 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. IV 1992)).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 543(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). The Commission classified systems in the
"municipal" category as either those that are operated by the franchising authority or those
that compete with systems that are operated by the authority. In practice, however, these
systems are ones that are operated by the authority.
9. Rates for the "basic tier" are to be regulated by local franchising authorities using
an approach mandated by the FCC. Rates for other tiers, "cable programming services,"
are to be regulated by the Commission itself. Rates for premium service remain
unregulated.
10. 47 U.S.C. § 543(c)(2).
11. In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992: Rate Regulation, Survey Results and Technical Appendix to Re-
port and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 FCC Rcd. 5631, app. E
(1993) [hereinafter Appendix El.
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cal approach and concluded that the differential was seventeen
percent.
12
Using the results of its statistical analyses, the FCC established a
set of "benchmark" rates.'3 Cable systems with rates that exceed
these benchmarks must reduce their rates by seventeen percent (the
"full-reduction" rate), or to the benchmark, whichever requires a
smaller reduction.' The FCC is currently considering whether to re-
quire all noncompetitive systems to reduce rates by the full seventeen
percent regardless of whether that would bring their rates below the
competitive benchmarks. Cable operators who believe their costs jus-
tify a smaller rate reduction may petition their local franchising au-
thority or the FCC for a cost-of-service proceeding.
15
As part of its rate regulation scheme, the FCC also prescribed
future rate adjustments. The FCC rules permit operators to raise their
rates to compensate for inflation and for "external" (e.g., program-
ming) cost increases. The rules also prescribe how much rates may
increase, or decrease, when a new service is added or deleted. 6 Fi-
nally, the most vague, and perhaps the most important component of
the new regulatory scheme is the requirement of FCC approval for an
operator to recover some or all of the costs of plant modernization
through an increase in regulated rates.'7
Consequently, it is important to understand the analytical under-
pinnings of the FCC's regulatory regime, because the FCC's imple-
mentation of the 1992 Cable Act can substantially affect the services
available to cable subscribers. The principal objective of this Article is
to evaluate the methods and data used by the FCC to estimate the
competitive differential and to determine the benchmark rates. We
12. In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992: Rate Regulation, Second Order on Reconsideration, Fourth Re-
port and Order, and Fifth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 9 FCC Rcd. 4119, app. C (1994)
[hereinafter Appendix C]. The rates being analyzed in the 1994 Order and those in the
1993 Order, supra note 11, are somewhat different. In the 1993 Order, the Commission
defined rates as service and equipment revenues per channel per basic subscriber. In the
1994 Order, rates are defined as service and equipment revenue per basic subscriber. For
ease of exposition, we refer to both of these as the "rates."
13. In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992: Rate Regulation, Second Order on Reconsideration, Fourth Re-
port and Order, and Fifth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 9 FCC Rcd. 4119, para. 1 (1994)
[hereinafter Second Order]. These benchmark rates represent estimates of the rates that
would be charged by a system with particular characteristics if it were subject to effective
competition.
14. Id. para. 2.
15. Id. para. 3.
16. These so-called "going forward" adjustments are currently under review.
17. Second Order, supra note 13, para. 6.
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conclude that the FCC's estimate is very sensitive to the statistical
method used and to the data used in the estimation. In addition, the
number of observations of effectively competitive systems is very
small in relation to the use to which they are put. Put simply, we have
little confidence in the FCC's estimate of the competitive differential.
I
The FCC's Approach to Estimating Effectively
Competitive Rates
The FCC's approach to estimating the competitive differential
was to compare the rates charged by systems deemed subject to effec-
tive competition under the 1992 Cable Act with rates charged by a
random sample of other systems, after accounting for the effect of
"other factors" on rates.18 Specifically, the FCC's analysis is used to
determine the percentage difference-the competitive differential-
between the rates for basic service offerings of "effectively competi-
tive" cable systems and those of other systems, where the offerings
include installation, equipment, and program service. After using this
differential to determine its competitive rate, the system must "back
out" the actual costs of installation and equipment to determine its
maximum permitted rate for basic cable program service.' 9
A. The FCC's Sample
In conducting its analysis, the FCC initially surveyed 748 "cable
community units." 2° Of these, three hundred were from a one percent
random sample of all cable community units.21 The remainder were
drawn from units where there was believed to be at least one other
multichannel video service provider, units where cable penetration
18. The 1992 Cable Act distinguishes between basic cable service and cable program-
ming service where the latter can be thought of as the array of satellite-delivered program-
ming services not offered on a per-channel basis and not offered on that package of
services that includes local broadcast stations. The Act mandates that basic cable rates are
to be set at "reasonable" levels while rates for cable programming services are to be set at
levels that are "not unreasonable." 47 U.S.C. § 543(b)(1), (b)(4)(c) (Supp. IV. 1992). The
Commission, however, has adopted a unitary regulatory regime in which the same esti-
mated competitive differential is used for both basic and cable programming services. As a
result, future references in this Article to basic cable service are intended to apply to both
types of service. Per channel rates on different basic service tiers may diverge in the future
because cable systems are permitted to increase basic service rates to reflect increases in
program costs.
19. Second Order, supra note 13.
20. Appendix E, supra note 11, at 1. A cable community unit is probably equivalent to
a cable franchise area in most cases. A given cable system may thus contain more than one
cable community unit.
21. Id. at 2 n.2.
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was believed to be less than thirty percent, and units in the one hun-
dred largest cable systems. 22 Data was requested for these community
units, for the cable systems of which the community units were a part,
and for a second community unit of the same system.
Despite the fact that the FCC requested data for two community
units for each of 748 cable systems, the FCC used only 420 observa-
tions in estimating its revised benchmarks.23 Observations were elimi-
nated for: (a) systems the FCC had initially believed were effectively
competitive but did not meet the statutory definition; (b) the second
community unit, except for systems that were classified as effectively
competitive; (c) the one hundred largest cable systems, except where
they faced effective competition; and (d) community units that did not
contain data for all the variables included in the equation used by the
FCC to estimate the competitive differential.24
B. The Rates Analyzed by the FCC
The "rates" analyzed by the FCC actually represent measures of
the revenue per subscriber for basic cable services and equipment and
installation." For systems that charged combined rates for service,
equipment, and installation charges, the FCC's calculation used all ba-
sic revenues.26 For systems that charged separately for service, equip-
ment, and installation, the FCC attempted to add to the service
revenues an estimate of revenues for installation and equipment.
27
Where more than one tier of basic service was offered, the revenues
for all basic tiers were combined, and a single rate was calculated for
each system.
28
C. The FCC's Statistical Method
The statistical method used by the FCC to ascertain the relation-
ship between rates and effective competition is known as multiple re-
22. This suggests that the Commission initially identified 348 "overbuilt" or "low-pen-
etration" systems, (748 - 300 - 100 = 348), in the initial sample, although this number is
substantially larger than the number of such systems in the sample the Commission ana-
lyzed. The Commission's description of its sampling procedure does not refer to specific
requests for data from "municipal" systems. According to Appendix E, supra note 11, data
on these systems was obtained from the overbuilt and random samples.
23. Appendix E, supra note 11, at 1-2.
24. Telephone Interview with Scott Roberts, Mass Media Bureau, Federal Communi-
cations Commission (June 8, 1993).
25. Appendix E, supra note 11, at 4.
26. Id.
27. Below, we explain why we believe these estimates may contain serious errors. See
infra text accompanying notes 61-64.
28. Appendix E, supra note 11, at 5.
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gression analysis.29 Multiple regression analysis attempts to establish
a relationship between a dependent variable (in this case basic cable
rates), and a set of other factors, known as independent variables (in
this case the number of system subscribers, the total number of chan-
nels offered, and the percentage of channels occupied by satellite serv-
ices, among others).3 °
Multiple regression analysis provides an estimate of how much
the dependent variable changes when there is a change in the value of
one of the independent variables, holding constant the effects of all of
the other independent variables. These estimates-called regression
coefficients-are chosen in order to minimize the squared difference
between the actual values of the dependent variable and their pre-
dicted values using these coefficients. 3'
It is important to observe two aspects of multiple regression anal-
ysis. First, even the "true" relationship between the dependent and
independent variables will have some "errors"-outcomes cannot be
perfectly predicted.32 Second, estimates are based on a sample of ob-
servations, not the entire population, so the estimated coefficients
only approximate the "true" relationship. 33 Statistical methods are
then used to determine how good this approximation is likely to be.
Specifically, they permit the analyst to determine a range of values
within which the estimate of the unknown "true value" may lie. De-
pending on both the precision of the estimate and the degree of confi-
dence one wishes to have in the estimate, the range can be narrow or
wide.
34
These ranges also permit comparisons of the estimates with other
possible values that are hypothesized to be the "true value." For ex-
ample, one may be (and in most cases is) interested in whether the
estimated effect can be distinguished from no effect. To perform this
test, the analyst must construct a range around the estimate to ensure
29. For a more detailed discussion of regression analysis, see Franklin M. Fisher, Mul-
tiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980).
30. Other variables include the various demographic and economic characteristics of
the area served by the system and the proportion of subscribers that leased various types of
equipment from the operator.
31. The regression coefficients describe the relationship between the particular in-
dependent variable and the dependent variable. For example, if the coefficient of the per-
centage of satellite channels were two, an increase in that percentage by .5 would result in
a predicted rate increase of $1.00. This calculation is performed assuming that no other
variable has changed.
32. See generally Fisher, supra note 29.
33. Id.
34. For any given confidence level, the range will be narrower the more precise the
estimate. For any given level of precision, the range will be narrower for lower confidence
levels.
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that, with a probability of ninety-five percent, the constructed range
will contain the "true value." If that range does not contain the value
zero, the estimated regression coefficient is, in a statistical sense, sig-
nificantly different from zero (at the ninety-five percent confidence
level).3 5 Below, we consider a number of changes to the FCC's analy-
sis and the resultant effect on the statistical significance of the esti-
mated competitive differential.36
The same kind of statistical analysis can be used to determine
whether adding an independent variable significantly improves the
ability of a regression to explain the dependent variable. Thus, we
also consider whether adding a number of independent variables to
the FCC's equation affects its overall explanatory power.
D. The FCC's Equation
The FCC used its data to analyze the difference in rates between
effectively competitive and other community units, controlling for dif-
ferences in the number of system subscribers, the number of channels
and the number of satellite services offered, measures of the propor-
tion of subscribers who lease converters or remote control devices
from the operator, and other system characteristics and demographic
characteristics of the area served by the system.37 Based on its initial
analysis, in which it estimated a single competitive differential, the
FCC concluded that, for otherwise identical systems, a system con-
fronting effective competition would charge about ten percent less
than one that confronted no such competition.38 Subsequently, the
FCC modified its equation in a number of ways. First, the FCC in-
cluded a large number of additional explanatory variables.39 Second,
it estimated separate competitive differentials for each of the three
classes of effectively competitive systems-overbuilds, "low-penetra-
tion, and municipal systems.4" The FCC estimated the differential at
35. An equivalent way of characterizing this conclusion is to say that at the 5% level of
significance, this coefficient is different from zero, meaning that, in repeated samples, if the
true coefficient were equal to zero, one would observe a value as large as the estimated
value only 5% of the time. Because this result is so unlikely, the better conclusion is that
the estimated coefficient is different from zero.
36. The reader should take care to distinguish statistical significance from the magni-
tude of the estimated effect. A regression coefficient may be statistically different from
zero, but the associated variable may still have a small effect on the dependent variable.
37. Appendix E, supra note 11, para. 27.
38. See Appendix E, supra note 11.
39. Data on demographic characteristics and the proportion of subscribers who leased
a particular type of equipment were not included in the equation that the FCC initially
estimated to determine the competitive differential. Appendix C, supra note 12, at 194.
40. See generally id. at 185.
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approximately sixteen percent for overbuilds, zero for low-penetra-
tion systems, and thirty-seven percent for systems that were both
overbuilt and municipally owned.41 Based on a rough "weighting" of
the three estimates, the FCC concluded that the competitive differen-
tial it should apply to all systems was seventeen percent.42 Thus,
although the FCC claimed that its estimate of the competitive differ-
ential was based on the behavior of all effectively competitive sys-
tems,43 the weights accorded to the low-penetration and municipal
systems appear to be so small that, in effect, the differential was based
almost entirely on the behavior of the overbuilt systems.
I
Analysis of the FCC's Approach
This section demonstrates that the FCC's estimate of the compet-
itive differential is quite fragile. We conclude that the estimate is very
sensitive to the construction of the FCC's sample, the variables used
in its analysis, the number of observations of effectively competitive
systems, and the specification of the equation employed by the FCC.
A. The FCC's Sample
In its first effort to estimate the competitive differential, the
FCC's sample contained observations for only 110 competitive units
among the 377 observations that were used to estimate the FCC's
equation. 4 Of these, sixty-four were low-penetration units, thirty-one
were overbuilt units, and fifteen were municipal units. 5 In its most
41. Second Order, supra note 13, paras. 29-31.
42. Specifically, the FCC stated:
In selecting [the 17 percent] figure, we were guided by the 16 percent figure esti-
mated from our data on overbuilds that measures [sic] full head-to-head competi-
tion. We moved upward from 16 percent to reflect our conclusion that cable
operators in an overbuild situation are likely over time to develop a tacit under-
standing of rate levels that may limit the intensity of rate competition. However,
we did not depart upward as far as we might have, despite the evidence relating to
municipal systems ....
Id. para. 32.
43. Id. para. 58.
44. Appendix E, supra note 11.
45. Analysis of the data indicates there were only 101 different competitive systems in
the sample. Some of the second units were apparently for different systems than some of
the first units. As a result, the number of second units is not simply the difference between
the number of independent systems and the number of first units. The argument for includ-
ing second units in the sample is presumably that they contain information that is not
present in the first units. There are two responses to this argument. First, it seems likely
that data for the second units will often duplicate the data for the first, so that the apparent
increase in the number of observations may be spurious. Second, if, in fact, the second unit
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 17:203
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recent analysis, the FCC's sample contained 420 community units, in-
cluding observations for 198 effectively competitive units, 148 of
which were for low-penetration units, 39 for overbuilt units, and 11 for
municipal units.46
Apparently, the FCC was initially concerned about the possibility
that a random sample of all systems would result in a relatively small
proportion of large systems. The FCC initially "oversampled" large
cable systems "to compensate for the small number of large systems
likely to appear in a random sample" because most subscribers are
served by large systems.47 However, the FCC did not use observa-
tions on these systems in its analysis except in the few instances where
they were identified as effectively competitive. Why the FCC dis-
carded this information from larger systems remains a puzzle, particu-
larly since their inclusion may have permitted the FCC to estimate the
competitive differentials more precisely for systems with a large
number of subscribers.
The sample size of 110 effectively competitive systems initially
used to estimate the competitive differential was not unusually small
in the conventional statistical sense. Nonetheless, it does appear small
given the purpose for which the FCC was using the data, namely for
determining the benchmark rates for thirty-three thousand commu-
nity units. 48 As compared to a larger sample of effectively competitive
systems, the sample used by the FCC is more likely to contain outlying
observations that will affect both the estimate of the competitive dif-
ferential and its precision. In larger samples, such outliers tend to be
offset by other more typical observations.
In its most recent analysis, the FCC relied on even fewer observa-
tions.49 It placed little emphasis on the estimated differential for low-
penetration systems on the presumption that they were not "truly"
competitive, and instead relied almost entirely on the differential esti-
data contains additional information, this data should be included for the noncompetitive
as well as the competitive systems.
46. Some franchises satisfied more than one of the "effectively competitive"
definitions.
47. In re Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992:
Rate Regulation, Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 226, para. 3 (1992). Presumably, the reason for ini-
tially oversampling the larger systems was to reflect the fact that it is subscribers, not sys-
tems, that rate regulation is designed to serve. Because the population of cable systems
contain a disproportionate share of systems with relatively few subscribers, a random sam-
ple of all systems will contain many of these small systems. That is, most of the systems
included will not be of the kind to which consumers actually subscribe. To make the sam-
ple more representative of the universe of systems to which consumers actually subscribe,
one would oversample the larger systems.
48. Appendix E, supra note 11, at n.2.
49. Appendix C, supra note 12.
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mated for overbuilt franchises.5 0 There were only thirty-nine such ob-
servations in the sample.' In addition, the FCC calculated the
competitive differential as that existing for those franchise areas in
which all homes had access to two cable systems.5 2 Only twelve such
observations were in the FCC's sample. Worse, the FCC indicated
that the kind of franchise that is most likely to be "truly competitive"
is one in which a private system competes with a municipal system for
the patronage of every home passed. Only one such franchise was in
the FCC's sample. 4
B. The FCC's Equation
Stripped to its essentials, the approach taken by the FCC involves
using the rates charged by the effectively competitive systems to de-
termine the rates that can be charged by systems not subject to effec-
tive competition. The role of the other variables in the FCC's
equation is to control for differences between the two types of systems
other than their competitive situations.5
The FCC's estimate of the competitive differential is based on
two implicit, and apparently untested, assumptions. First, the FCC as-
sumed that the same equation explains the variation in rates for all
cable systems regardless of the number of subscribers that the systems
serve.56 That is, by estimating a single equation for all systems, the
FCC has assumed that the effect on cable rates of the number of chan-
nels, the number of satellite services, and importantly, the magnitude
of the competitive differential have the same effect on rates for all
cable systems. In fact, the effect of any one or all of these variables on
subscriber rates may depend on the number of subscribers served by
the system-a source of potential error in the FCC's estimates.57 Be-
low, we report results-using the FCC's revised data-that indicate
50. Id.
51. Id. at 186.
52. Id. at 189-90.
53. Id. at 188.
54. Id. at 186.
55. Id. at 189.
56. Id. at 194.
57. One reason for focusing on subscriber-size related differences is that systems with
more subscribers (or homes passed) tend to have different costs than other systems. See,
e.g., Eli Noam, Economies of Scale in Cable Television: A Multiproduct Analysis, in VIDEO
MEDIA COMPETITION 93, 93-120 (Eli Noam ed., 1985); Bruce M. Owen & Peter R. Green-
halgh, Competitive Policy Considerations in Cable Television Franchising, in 4 CONTEMP.
POL'Y ISSUES, 69, 69-79 (1986). As a result, the extent to which the noncompetitive rate
exceeds the effectively competitive rate will tend to vary with subscriber size. We are
aware, of course, that the FCC has included the number of subscribers as an explanatory
variable in its equation. However, the FCC's specification assumes that the relationship
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that there are substantial differences in the determinants of rates for
systems of different sizes. In particular, the estimates of the competi-
tive differential are quite sensitive to this respecification.58
The FCC's second assumption is that the only factor that causes
rates to differ between competitive and noncompetitive systems is the
presence or absence of effective competition. All other factors are
assumed to have the same effect on the rates for both types of sys-
tems. 59 Thus, for example, the effect of a change in the franchise
area's income or age profile on the basic cable rate is the same
whether or not a system is effectively competitive.' Below, we report
results that indicate significant differences between the coefficients for
the two types of systems.
C. The FCC's Rate Data
As noted above, the rates that the FCC analyzed are actually the
average revenue from basic service, installation, and equipment rental
per subscriber.61 Notably, the FCC has reported that there were many
shortcomings in the equipment data it received.62 As a result, the
FCC was forced to estimate equipment revenues for many systems in
its sample.63 What is perhaps not fully realized is that small errors in
making these adjustments can have a significant imlact on the esti-
mated competitive differential.
Consider an effectively competitive cable system that offers ten
channels of cable service and charges twenty dollars for service and
equipment, for a price of two dollars per channel. Now consider a
cable system that does not face effective competition, that also offers
ten channels of service and actually charges fifteen dollars for cable
between rates and other variables, such as the effectively competitive differential or the
number of satellite services, is the same regardless of the number of subscribers.
58. We realize that the FCC must be concerned with the effect of estimating separate
equations for each size class on the number of degrees of freedom that it has available.
However, the FCC has no choice in the matter if the specifications differ when systems are
classified by the number of subscribers.
59. Appendix C, supra note 12, at 193-95.
60. This point refers to possible differences between the equations that explain rates
for competitive and noncompetitive systems. The previous point considered differences in
the equations for systems with different numbers of subscribers regardless of whether or
not they are competitive.
61. The FCC compared data on revenue per subscriber rather than rates. This means
that its dependent variable depends both on the rates charged and the quantities of serv-
ices and equipment used by subscribers to a system. In its latest effort, although not in its
initial one, the FCC attempted to control for differences in quantities by including them as
independent variables in its regression equation.
62. Appendix C, supra note 12, at 13.
63. Appendix E, supra note 11, at 4.
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service and seven dollars for equipment. If the information about
both systems is reported accurately, the competitive differential will
be calculated as [($15 + $7) / $20] - 1, or ten percent. Suppose, how-
ever, that the rate for equipment for the second of the systems is esti-
mated by the FCC at eithersix or nine dollars. In the former case, the
estimated differential is [($15 + $6) / $20] - 1, or five percent. In the
latter case, the estimated differential is [($15 + $9) / $20] - 1, or twenty
percent. Estimates that are half as large, or twice as large, as the true
differential can result from what appear to be relatively small errors in
the estimates of equipment rates.
The FCC has indicated that it was able to correct for deficiencies
in the equipment data in fifty out of sixty-four cases in which the
equipment data appeared to be incorrect.6' Our own experience with
the equipment data in the FCC's original database suggests a far
larger number of observations in which the equipment data are ques-
tionable, and far greater difficulty in correcting for these deficiencies
using data that were submitted by respondents. Thus, we remain
highly skeptical that the data used by the FCC accurately reflect the
rates that are actually being charged. Below, we report the results of
an analysis of the FCC's equation using alternative estimates of equip-
ment revenues and find that the use of these data significantly changes
the estimated competitive differential.
D. Summary
In short, there are at least four major concerns about the FCC's
estimates of the competitive differential: (1) the behavior of effec-
tively competitive and noneffectively competitive systems may differ
for reasons other than the presence or absence of competition, so that
the FCC's equation may be misspecified; (2) the FCC's rate equation
may also be misspecified because the same equation is applied to all
systems regardless of the number of subscribers they serve; (3) the
number of effectively competitive systems in the FCC's sample is
small given the use to which such data is put; and (4) the FCC is un-
likely to have dealt effectively with the "spotty" nature of the equip-
ment data in its sample. The FCC has ignored some of these problems
and has had only limited success in dealing with others. As a result,
the FCC's estimates may be biased and may not be very precise.
64. Id. at 8.
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Testing the FCC's Untested Assumptions
We have attempted to overcome the first and second of the short-
comings described above, both of which involve possible misspecifica-
tions of the FCC's equation, and we report the results of doing so
below. However, the problem of the small number of observations for
competitive systems cannot be overcome. While we have also devel-
oped estimates that use what we consider to be a more precise ap-
proach to the inclusion of equipment costs, the resulting number of
observations is fewer than one-third of the already small number used
by the FCC. In much of the analysis reported below, we have used
the FCC's data and have accepted the FCC's adjustments for equip-
ment costs, despite considerable skepticism about the quality of the
adjustments. We have also adopted the basic functional form em-
ployed by the FCC. Finally, we did not take account of variables that
might help explain the variation in rates but which were not used by
the FCC in its reported equation. In short, we stayed as close as possi-
ble to the FCC's basic approach to sample selection, data construc-
tion, and estimation, while attempting to determine the effects of
modifying some of the implicit assumptions the FCC has made in its
statistical analysis.65
We first compared the rates charged by effectively competitive
cable systems to the rates charged by noneffectively competitive sys-
tems taking into account differences in the total number of channels
offered, the number of satellite services offered, the number of sub-
scribers served, and other variables considered by the FCC. However,
we allowed for the possibility that the estimated competitive differen-
tial differed among systems that served different numbers of subscrib-
ers. In particular, we estimated an equation identical to that
estimated by the FCC except that it allowed for a different coefficient
65. In passing, it should be noted that the confidence interval around the estimated
competitive rate for any particular system may be quite large because of the failure of the
equation to explain a large part of the variation in rates or because only a handful of
observations were used to estimate the 16% differential. We used the FCC's equation to
predict the noncompetitive rate and the competitive rate for a completely overbuilt
franchise area, setting all the other variables at their noncompetitive averages. We then
constructed the 95% confidence interval around this estimate and found that it included
the predicted noncompetitive rate. Thus, at the 95% confidence level, the Commission's
equation predicts no statistical difference between the competitive and noncompetitive
rates.
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of the competitive differential for cable systems according to sub-
scriber size.66
When estimating the FCC's basic equation for the different sub-
scriber size classes, we obtained results that are, in many respects,
quite different from those obtained using the FCC's approach. When
all units are included, the estimated competitive differential is approx-
imately sixteen percent and statistically significant. Table 1 indicates
the estimated competitive differentials for the different size classes.
Table 1
Using the Commission's Equation to Estimate the




1,001 - 3,500 -0.35*
3,501 - 10,000 -0.20*
10,001 - 50,000 -0.001
> 50,000 -0.08
* Significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
Three things are notable about this table. First, the estimated compet-
itive differentials for the various subscriber size classes vary considera-
bly, from a maximum of thirty-five percent to. virtually zero. Second,
only three of the estimated competitive differentials, those for the
three smallest size categories, are statistically significant at the confi-
dence level employed by the FCC. Most subscribers are served by
larger systems for which the estimated differential is not significantly
different from zero. Third, the estimated competitive differential for
the largest size categories is only half as large as that estimated by the
FCC. In short, the FCC's estimate of a single competitive differential,
sixteen percent, masks considerable heterogeneity among system
classes. More over, an equation that permits the competitive differen-
tial to vary with the subscriber size category explains significantly
more of the variation in rates than does the FCC's regression.67
66. Cable subscriber sizes were based on the five categories used by the General Ac-
counting Office in its study of cable rates. An appendix containing the detailed statistical
results is available from the authors on request.
67. Coefficients of individual variables can be compared using T-tests and the two
equations can be compared using an F test. See POTLURi RAO & ROGER L. MILLER, AP-
PLIED ECONOMETRICS 88-93 (1971) (discussion of the use of dummy variables to measure
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Next, we tested the sensitivity of the differential to the possibility
that the effects of the explanatory variables on rates may themselves
depend on whether the franchise was overbuilt. If this were true,
there would be no single competitive differential for all systems;
rather, the differential, would depend on. the magnitude of the in-
dependent variables for each system. Testing this possibility involved
re-estimating the equation with the addition of variables that are the
product of the overbuild variable and (in the experiment run here) the
demographic variables in the FCC's data base.
This expanded equation explains significantly more of the varia-
tion in basic cable rates than does the FCC's equation.6 8 Moreover,
when the cable rate is predicted using the means of all the variables,
the competitive differential is about seventeen percent, approximately
the same as the FCC's estimate. However, if the prediction uses the
nationwide average instead of the sample average of the demographic
variables, the differential declines to three percent. Thus, the FCC's
presumption that the explanatory variables have the same rate effects
for overbuilt and other franchises is incorrect. The fact that the differ-
ential falls considerably when nationwide demographic means are
used suggests the FCC's unrepresentative sample may have biased its
results.
These tests confirm that the FCC's implicit assumptions-that the
same equation is appropriate for all size classes and that the relation-
ships between the dependent and the independent variables (other
than the average competitive differential) are the same for competi-
tive and noncompetitive systems-are too restrictive. In short, all of
these tests indicate there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the
applicability of a single differential to all systems.
Finally, we estimated the FCC's rate equation using only observa-
tions for the effectively competitive systems. Using that regression to
predict what the rates of the non-effectively competitive systems
would be if they were effectively competitive and came from the same
population as the effectively competitive systems, they then compared
the predictions to the rates currently being charged.
For noneffectively competitive systems with fewer than ten thou-
sand subscribers, the regression tends to predict that most of the over-
built rates are less than the current noneffectively competitive rates.
For systems in excess of ten thousand subscribers, however, the pre-
differences in behavior between two groups where differences can be present in both the
intercept and the slopes of the estimated equation).
68. The increase in the explanatory power of the regression from the addition of these
variables is statistically significant at a 99% confidence level.
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dicted competitive rate exceeds the current rate in sixty percent of the
cases.
69
It is instructive to consider how the FCC has reacted to findings
like these. Specifically, the FCC (using a somewhat different ap-
proach) found that the size of the differential did vary in a statistically
significant way with system subscriber size. 70 Thus, their statistics in-
dicate that accounting for subscriber size in estimating "the" competi-
tive differential is appropriate. However, the FCC's conclusion here
that "any partitioning of the data into size classes will be arbitrary"
7 1
contrasts sharply with its reasoning underlying its earlier decision to
estimate separate effectively competitive differentials for each of the
three effectively competitive groups. There, the FCC concluded that
"[b]ecause the differences among the coefficients . . . for the three
separate competitive samples were statistically significant, we con-
cluded that it was inappropriate to lump them together and represent
them with a single variable in the regression analysis.
'72
IV
Accounting for Equipment Revenues
In accounting for equipment revenues in constructing cable rates,
the dependent variable in its equation, the FCC divided observations
into three groups: (i) franchises in which equipment charges were
bundled with service charges, i.e., there was no separate charge for
equipment; (ii) franchises that did not bundle and for which equip-
ment price and quantity data were deemed sufficiently complete to be
included in the sample; and (iii) franchises that did not bundle and did
not provide sufficient data to calculate equipment revenues directly.
73
For this third group, the FCC calculated equipment revenues by as-
suming that the percentage of the franchise's basic revenues ac-
counted for by equipment was identical to the corresponding
percentage of the parent system of which the franchise was a part.74
Unlike the FCC, we concluded that most of the equipment data
provided by cable franchisees is seriously in error. For example, sev-
enty-five percent of the franchises reported that no more than ten per-
69. This calculation is sensitive to the subscriber threshold. For example, if the sub-
scriber threshold is 10,000 instead of 5,000, the predicted "competitive rate" is higher than
the actual noncompetitive rate for "only" about 18% of the franchises in the larger size
category.
70. Appendix C, supra note 12, at 196.
71. Id. at 23.
72. Id. at 5.
73. Appendix E, supra note 11, at 4.
74. Id. at 4.
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cent of subscribers used set-top converters." This would imply that in
the vast majority of franchises, ninety percent or more of the subscrib-
ers have cable-ready sets. Similarly, seventy-five percent of the
franchises reported that no more than twenty-five percent of the sub-
scribers rented remote control devices from the cable operator.76
These figures do not make sense when considered together.
Perhaps more significantly, when we applied the FCC's "missing
data" methodology to all observations (on the assumption that most
franchise-level data on equipment are quite poor), and re-estimated
the FCC's equation, the competitive differential for overbuilt systems
was not significantly different from zero. This result is consistent with
one of two possibilities: either the FCC's method for estimating
equipment revenues is quite poor, or the FCC's approach has created
a spurious correlation between cable rates and the presence of an
overbuilt franchise.
V
Should Low-Penetration Systems Have Been
Eliminated from the Analysis?
Although the 1992 Cable Act defines three groups of effectively
competitive franchises, the FCC in the end virtually placed the entire
weight on the overbuilt systems in its sample in estimating the com-
petitive differential, and virtually eliminated the influence of the low-
penetration systems. 7 The reasoning behind this FCC determination
is both unclear and incomplete.
The FCC apparently believes that some systems may have low-
penetration even if they do not face effective competition. Even if the
FCC were justified in deleting the low-penetration systems, this does
not mean the FCC should rely solely or at all on the overbuilt system
observations in estimating the competitive differential. Instances of
overbuilding may be unsustainable because the rates being charged
are insufficient for both systems to cover their entire cost, so observed
rates may reflect disequilibrium behavior.
In the short run, overbuilt systems can coexist so long as both
obtain revenues that exceed their variable costs. In the long run, i.e.,
75. Authors' calculations using the FCC database.
76. Authors' calculations using the FCC database.
77. The FCC initially considered literally eliminating the low-penetration systems
from its analysis but ultimately decided not to do so, perhaps because it feared that this
could create a legal challenge to its actions. Nonetheless, the effect of its actions was to
virtually eliminate the effect of these observations. Indeed, the competitive differential is
17% when estimated using only observations for overbuilt and noncompetitive franchises.
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when all costs are variable, one of the systems may fail, or the systems
may merge, unless rates at least equal total costs. 78 Although the rates
observed during the short run are the result of competition, if they are
not sufficient to cover total costs, they will not equal long-run compet-
itive equilibrium rates. As a result, ,these rates will be poor
benchmarks for systems that are not subject to competition.79
This discussion indicates that obtaining appropriate competitive
benchmarks by observing the market behavior of cable systems is
likely to be difficult. However, selectively eliminating observations
for low-penetration systems because they may not involve truly com-
petitive rates is not the solution to this problem. The reason is that
the overbuilt franchises contain their own difficulties. Removing ob-
servations on systems with rates that are thought to be too high is no
solution if the remaining systems have rates that are too low. That is
why it is important to consider other methods for determining the
competitive benchmarks as a check on the FCC's estimate.
The FCC also ascribed a low weight to municipal systems, despite
its belief that the most effectively competitive franchise was likely to
be one in which a municipally-owned system competed with a private
system.8' The FCC believed that municipalities were more likely to
price competitively because they were directly accountable to voters. 81
By contrast, in the FCC's view, two private cable operators competing
head-to-head are more likely to reach an accommodation to maintain
price at supracompetitive levels.82 However, municipal systems may
charge low rates because they can avoid costs that must be incurred by
private firms, or because they can shift costs elsewhere in the munici-
pal budget.
VI
Other Observations on the FCC's Approach
In addition to the shortcomings noted above, there is an addi-
tional problem with the FCC's approach. The full reduction rate itself
is probably exaggerated for many noncompetitive systems. The FCC
calculated the differential by comparing a franchise with no competi-
tion to one that is completely overbuilt. In fact, most systems face
78. Their ability to do so will depend on the nature of competition between them,
which will depend, in part, on the extent to which the systems offer differentiated services.
79. The FCC recognized the same point when it noted that the prices of some commu-
nity units "may be below cost and may not be sustainable in the long run." Appendix E,
supra note 11, at 13.
80. Second Order, supra note 13, para. 31.
81. Id.
82. Id. para. 30.
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some competitors, whether they are SMATV83 operators, MMDS 84
operators, HSDs, 85 or other cable operators at the boundaries of the
franchise area.86 Yet the FCC's use of the seventeen percent differen-
tial does not account for the fact that these franchises-while not ef-
fectively competitive according to the 1992 Cable Act-may still be
charging rates that are lower than the fully noncompetitive rate.
For example, using the FCC's analysis, a franchise confronting
competition for ten percent of its homes passed would have rates that
were about two percent less than a franchise with no competitors. The
full reduction rate for this franchise would be fifteen percent (i.e., sev-
enteen percent less the two percent already attained). A franchise
confronting competition for twenty-five percent of its homes passed
would have a full reduction rate of about 12.7 percent. And a
franchise confronting competition for forty-five percent of its homes
passed would have a full reduction rate of 9.4 percent.
VII
Going Forward
The regulatory scheme described in the preceding paragraphs es-
tablishes only the initial regulated rates for basic cable service. Over
time, operators will be able to adjust those rates to recover cost in-
creases due to inflation -and other easily verifiable factors (e.g.,
franchise fee changes). In addition, the FCC will permit operators to
pass programming cost increases through to subscribers. As a result,
the effect of the rate regulation on programmers' incentives to de-
velop new programming for existing services will be mitigated.87
The FCC has not yet decided how to adjust rates when regulated
services are added or deleted. The current proposal is to permit oper-
ators to pass the programming costs directly to subscribers and also to
permit the operator to recover channel activation costs based on the
FCC's regression analysis, plus 7.5 percent of programming costs to
account for marketing and other expenses. 88 However, for larger sys-
tems, the permitted nonprogramming cost component would be triv-
ial, amounting to only about two or three cents per subscriber per
83. Satellite Master Antenna Television system.
84. Multichannel Multipoint Distribution System.
85. Home Satellite Dish systems.
86. These are in addition to competition these systems face from local broadcasters.
87. The effect will not be eliminated, however, to the extent that the regulated rates
are set too low, as will certainly be true for some services.
88. Second Order, supra note 13, para. 246.
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month. If adopted, this approach will discourage operators from de-
leting less valued services and adding new services.
Finally, and perhaps most critically, operators wishing to upgrade
their systems to take advantage of digital compression and other tech-
nological advances must first receive permission from the FCC if any
of the costs are to be recovered through increases in regulated rates.
Specifically, the FCC announced that operators must seek FCC ap-
proval before setting rates for new services pursuant to the incentive
upgrade plan. 9 Cable operators have the opportunity to achieve
higher profits if they invest wisely and introduce services to meet cus-
tomer needs.
The FCC apparently believes that regulators rather than consum-




The analysis in this paper demonstrates a number of fundamental
difficulties with the FCC's approach to estimating the competitive dif-
ferential for cable television systems. These difficulties arise from the
data employed and the statistical methods used. Because the estimate
of the competitive differential is quite sensitive to straightforward
modifications of the FCC's basic approach, the reliability of the result-
ing estimate is suspect. Most importantly, the fact that the FCC's esti-
mate is based on so few effectively competitive systems-indeed it
appears to be based almost entirely on the small number of overbuilt
systems in the sample-warrants a high degree of skepticism about
the validity of the FCC's approach.9"
89. Executive Summary-Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (MM Docket No. 93-215), Daily Digest, Feb. 23,
1994, at 2-3.
90. We understand that the FCC must develop some standards for an "effectively com-
pe'titive rate." They would urge the FCC to attempt to validate its estimates by3comparing
them with estimates obtained using different approaches. For example, one might rely on
past differences between regulated rates and nonregulated rates as a measure of the com-
petitive differential. Using the data provided by the GAO in its cable studies suggest that
the "effectively regulated" differential is no more than 10%.
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